New changes in the governance model of county government

The new changes in the county government governance model are largely a response to central government regulation. Through the investigation of the large-scale urbanization project operation phenomenon in the county, the "administrative-political one company" triad integration governance analysis framework is proposed to explain the role of local government in this process. With the help of the "project platform", through the administrative examination and approval power to obtain monopoly power over the core resources such as land, through the political mobilization to play a leading force, through the corporate system to assume the role of the main body of economic development, the county government's power, will, performance three unprecedentedly To promote, create new vitality. This integrated governance model has penetrated into all levels of urban and rural construction, making the government's energy and role far beyond the previous research. The evolution of this role is an important reason for the rapid progress and predicament of county-level cities (towns).

For more than 30 years since the reform and opening up of the Trinity, China has experienced sustained economic growth and created a world-famous Chinese miracle. In the discussion of many factors that formed this "miracle", "inter-county competition" was once seen as It is a big driving force for growth. 1" Local government corporatism" is used to explain the successful reasons for the rapid development of county township enterprises, and to establish the positive role of local governments in economic transformation and intervention in territorial enterprises. Development has clearly become the core issue of urban and rural reform. In the new era of rapid urbanization (town), the county issue is particularly important.

Then, after the industrialization of the county represented by township enterprises, the role of the county government has evolved. What are the factors that constrain each other and cooperate with each other to create new vitality, and what new institutional mechanism makes the county The three driving forces of government's power, will and performance can re-engage each other and form a new governance situation. At the same time, what causes the county's urbanization to rapidly advance and fall into a new predicament? For those who need to pay more attention to "what is happening"

I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their pertinent suggestions and the “National Construction and Government Behavior” research platform and the Urbanization Seminar.

1 See Zhang Wuchang: “I have never seen such a good system in my life”, Southern Weekend, September 11, 2008, E31.

The process research turns to the mechanism research and institutional logic research of how things happen, and the behavioral research of the parties.

First, the new tendency of “unification” of county governments was first proposed by American scholar Dai Muzhen to explain the rapid development of Chinese township enterprises in the 1980s and the reasons for their success, and to reveal the main contents and methods of grassroots government intervention in economic activities. She believes that the government and local communities and enterprises have formed a corps organization and become a community of interests, thus promoting the take-off of local township enterprises. Later, Wei Ande put forward the idea of ​​“government is the manufacturer”, comparing the local government image with the headquarters of the company, treating the local companies as subsidiaries, and participating in organizing their economic activities, emphasizing the local government's transformation in China's economy and intervention in local enterprises. positive effects. Lin Nan used "local market socialism" to explain the success of township enterprises, emphasizing that the relationship network based on family kinship is an important foundation for building the integration ties of local governments, markets and community members, and that party, government, and enterprise are integrated. The organization of the corporation has the characteristics of socialist organization; targeting the market, and making the organization with this characteristic have an advantage in the competition, has become the key to the take-off of many local economies. This view clearly uses the "local government corporatism" to explain the reasons for the success of local township enterprises in China. Since the beginning of the 1990s, although the Chinese economy has maintained a momentum of rapid growth, township and village enterprises have no longer seen the scenery. A large number of collective enterprises have undergone restructuring through the process of privatization, or they have closed down and competed in the market with the growing private economy. This poses a challenge to “local government corporatism”. 2 It should be noted that the positive impact and promotion of local government corporatization on economic development is based on the observation of the heyday of township enterprises, and the government behind the rapid demise of township enterprises in the late 1990s. Internal relations, although there have been some studies, such as changes in central and local relations and the impact of tax-sharing systems, government-enterprise relations and the ills of township enterprises themselves, but the internal system paradox of "local government corporatism" and its The inevitable constraints have rarely been explored, and it is therefore impossible to predict the rapid decline of township enterprises.

1995, pp.301-354; Zhou Xueguang: "A Review of the Research on the Organizational and Institutional Changes in China in Western Sociology", "The New Changes in the Governance Model of Social County Governments Zhou Feizhou pointed out that the development model under the contract system can be used by local government corporations. Interpretation. Accompanying the tax sharing system is an urbanization development model, which is a development model combining land, finance and finance, which can be temporarily called the “three-in-one” development model. 1 This view reminds us of the new problems that arise in the new urbanization development model and the need for new interpretations. Zhou Xueguang pointed out that the collective demise of township enterprises in the late 1990s reflects the organizational behavior and political process of local governments as state bureaucrats. 2 He proposed an important perspective to explain the administrative process and political process of local government behavior. Zhao Shukai pointed out that from an economic point of view, whether "local government corporatism" can successfully mobilize the economy from quantitative to qualitative upgrading is still in doubt. On the political front, the ability of the government to infiltrate and mobilize society has declined as some local governments have become less loyal to the public goods and public services, become vested interests of the people, and have increased alienation with the local society. 3 The above research inspires us that under the urbanization development model, local government behavior has the characteristics of integrated governance of administration, politicization and corporatization. The dynamic mechanism of local development has been different from the industrialization period. Land has replaced enterprises and become a new core element of local growth. The main source of government finance has also become a tax directly related to land and urban construction, and a county with land development rights. The government needs a new integrated approach to possess, operate and govern jurisdictions to drive new growth and development engines. This change means that the local government has a monopoly on the development of the jurisdiction different from the township enterprise. “Local government corporatism” is difficult to explain the emerging forms of local integration, and it is even more difficult to explain the driving force of urban (town)ization.

In the theory of Dai Muzhen and others, the consistency of interests of the various actors in the local jurisdictions constructed by the “incentive structure” and “corporatization” shows more complex features. Due to the implementation of the tax-sharing system and the project system, the “incentive structure” of local governments has changed, and more control over resources has been obtained, which has become the government's biggest incentive. This means that public property rights are mainly land property rights and fiscal rights. Substituting corporate property rights has become the most important form of occupation of local governments, and the government's behavior has thus a more distinct monopoly. At the same time, it also means that macroeconomic stability, fair income distribution, access to fiscal transfers and foreign investment have become important economic, social and political resources for local development opportunities, and to master these resources and become a government integration place. An important foundation of interest. At the same time, in the community of interests formed by the “seeking resources and seeking development” within the jurisdiction, although the appeals of the various subjects are different, they are connected to each other, dependent on each other, and mutually restrictive. Government officials, while earning high salaries, have the opportunity to use administrative approval power and additional budgetary powers to expand power and benefits, and also hope for political achievements and more relaxed and adequate public spending. Capital owners hope to get government commitment and support, obtain construction land indicators, project commitment opportunities, preferential policies and market protection, etc., which requires a week of flying with the government: "Specialization of fiscal funds and their problems" "", "Social", No. 1, 2012; Liu Shouying, Jiang Shengsan: "Land financing and financial and financial risks come from a community of interest created by a developed region in the east. The behavior of the government thus has the characteristics of political mobilization in addition to administrative features.

The government no longer directly organizes economic entities, but uses the power of administrative power and land to manage "projects" to profit from it. In other words, the government manages the jurisdiction by means of a networked “project platform” organization.

This platform uses the “Administration, Politics, and One Company” trinity integration mechanism to link and mobilize local institutions and organizations associated with urbanization.

The following explanation can be given to the Trinity Integration Mechanism of “Administrative-Political One Company”.

The establishment of a networked “project platform” requires several important conditions different from the industrialization period. The local government has the condition to abandon the enterprise-based operation mode. Second, the land development rights and control rights are reconstructed under the goal of urbanization. The new type of government company with land management rights; thirdly, it will strive for administrative construction and policies that are conducive to urbanization, such as “expanding the county and strengthening the county” and “renovating the county”, etc., gaining the autonomy and independence of development and With the supporting policy support, it is possible to independently innovate the urbanization model of the territories and accelerate the pace of urbanization. Under these conditions, it is possible for the county government to operate the jurisdiction through the networked “project platform” organization, especially in the process of urbanization, to integrate stakeholders from outside the region and beyond.

Among them, land is the core element of local new economic growth (or urbanization), and the key condition for local governments to operate urbanization projects is to have land development rights. The government uses the "administration-politics-one company" trinity integration mechanism to make the local interest-related entities become a community of interests under the banner of development and profitability, and the jurisdictional government bears unlimited responsibility for this. Political and financial authority maintains its relative stability.

The so-called administrative mechanism 1 here is the power given to government agencies by the bureaucracy, representing a formal authority and based on institutional rules. These rules define the government's organizational goals, policy implementation, organizational concerns, and information gathering. The logic of administration is thing-based, and it is necessary to deal with problems in a conventional, procedural manner to reduce uncertainty. The premise is that the government has the power of administrative integration, adopts the bureaucratic system of bureaucratic or technical governance, and emphasizes the importance of planning, rules and procedures. On the project platform, the administrative mechanism collects land and arranges projects through the formulation of urbanization plans, formulates legal procedures for major project approvals, and establishes and guarantees loans for land reserve guarantees. This kind of "power" expressed by the administrative mechanism has been greatly expanded in the development of county-level territories due to new measures such as "extending power and strengthening the county".

The so-called political mechanism is an unconventional mode of power operation extended by administrative integration. It aims to break the shackles of the traditional bureaucracy, rely on political mobilization to increase the flexibility of governance, and enable organizations or individual authorities to cross the boundaries and cross the boundaries. Rule design creates influence. Its characteristics are as follows: the implementation of the current government or leader's strategic intentions 1 on administrative mechanisms and political mechanisms, see Zhou Xueguang: "Authoritative System and Effective Governance: Department of Contemporary Chinese State Governance", not published.

The new change chart of the county government governance model, unified struggle goals, mobilize extensive participation; second, establish a “special committee” decision-making mechanism across the department level to improve decision-making efficiency; third, create uncertainty and initiate special policies to Realize "special affairs". In the project platform, the People’s Congress can be used to provide investment and financing with special policies, such as the provision of loan repayment commitments, etc. This approach of integrating government, market, business, and civil society organizations with public goods and services has a tendency to politicize economic construction and urbanization. Obviously, the will of the county government expressed by political mechanisms "In order to expand the independent space for its development, it provides protection beyond the system in order to seek new impetus outside the national system (such as mobilizing capital and concluding a new community of local interests).

The so-called corporate mechanism is that the government, through the management of core resource elements, through the operation of land and other scarce resources, through the production, construction and operation of public goods project companies, capital mobilization, to achieve specific targets such as investment and financing, the implementation of "government-led integration The institutional arrangements and business strategies of the market mechanism rely on growth rates to achieve performance. Its characteristics are: flexible and efficient disposal of a large number of government-planned urbanization projects; second, the smooth transformation of land advantages into financial advantages; third, the use of "company system" to avoid legal risks, completed by "project system" The government's corporatization behavior, the interpretation of new political and business relations, political and silver relations, political and civil relations. Obviously, the corporate mechanism is a powerful means of achieving government performance under circumvention of policy and legal risks. The so-called performance is mainly based on the increase of input, the pursuit of GDP growth under top-down pressure; among them, due to the increasing contribution rate of urbanization, it needs more reliance on administrative and political organization mobilization. Ability to push each other for legitimacy.

Therefore, the triad is governed by a common system similar to the interests of large companies, but its integrated nature and ability transcends the corporate model. In particular, the integrated financial base is different from the contracting system and the tax sharing system, and is outside the fiscal system. Gained financial resources that amount far greater than fiscal revenue. According to the local department, relying on the platform organization method, the “investment and financing money exceeds the budget of the financial department, and the income is very large”, but this part is difficult to reflect the nature of public finance.

In this way, the institutional logic formed by the three functions of administration, politics and company is just like the triangle has considerable stability, which can continuously induce and constrain the behavior of each subject on the “project platform”. 1 It is especially suitable for solving project tasks. The problem encountered. Therefore, it is easier to understand why “doing a project” or “building a project platform” becomes an institutional thinking. Why is the county government using the superior “send out” project, and will also formulate the urbanization construction content according to the project system thinking? Work in a variety of projects. From the operation of urbanization projects in some places, not only can the government put financial allocations and subsidies into it, but also obtain bank loans through investment and financing companies. It can also be seen that the government has also invested in higher-level projects through “packaging”, especially It is invested in the construction of infrastructure such as roads, water supply, power supply, gas supply, drainage, communication, lighting, greening, and land leveling involved in the development of the land.

See Zhou Xueguang, Ai Yun: "Institutional Change under Multiple Logic: An Analytical Framework", "China Social Science" 2010, the significance of which far exceeds the "local government corporatism" observed by the academic circles in the early stage of rural industrialization. Concept. 1 The evolution of this government role has provided a powerful impetus for county economic development.

However, in the process of promoting each of the above three mechanisms, it can also be observed that they are mutually restrained. For example, although the power expressed by the administrative mechanism is continuously expanded by the political mechanism and the corporate mechanism, the administrative approval authority such as land must obey the political will of the leader, thus making it a soft constraint.

The normative role of the administrative mechanism is constantly being dispelled by the flexibility of the political mechanism. The political performance of the party and government leaders has continuously broken through the approval authority and has to seek new informal channels, thus adding more pressure to local finance.

Although the company mechanism can help the government to avoid certain legal risks, it brings pressure and threat to the legitimacy of the regime, such as the people and the government and developers caused by urbanization measures such as land acquisition, house demolition, and “upstairs”. Disputes between the two.

If we say that the development space of local governments in the planned economy era needs to be obtained by striving for resources; in the era of rural industrialization and marketization autonomy in reform, the local development space needs to be obtained through horizontal inter-county competition; then, the reform is coming At the stage of county-level autonomous urbanization, local development space needs to find new institutional arrangements and sources of motivation outside the national system. For example, in addition to social and political resources, there are also unlimited liability groups of “family-family” in local political culture, and even the driving force of emerging local interest groups.

Why county governments have such governance characteristics can make some analysis from the perspective of the hierarchical structure and function of the national government system.

As far as the characteristics of decentralization are concerned, the county is not only a first-level government that implements the tasks of higher-level tasks and engages in actual management, but also a government with complete powers, resources (especially land) management rights and relatively independent governance rights. Compared with higher-level governments such as regional governments, provincial governments, or state functional departments, they have specific responsibilities for more independent and independent governance. In the county reforms, the measures of “extending the power and strengthening the county”, “county reforming the city” and “providing the county” have made the county development more supportive and policy support for urbanization. From the perspective of urban and rural overall management, counties (cities) are more stable and operable than the higher-level provinces and cities and the towns and towns under them. It can be said that the urbanization, urban-rural integration and integration strategy endows the county (city)-level government with unprecedented unique capabilities and operational space, just as the higher-level government gives township governments greater operational space than other levels of government during the development of township enterprises. Therefore, the county (city) will have the ability and conditions to carry out the transformation from operating enterprises to operating land to operating cities. As far as its diversity is concerned, the differences in county areas are not only reflected in the economic appearance, but also in the deep structure of its regional resources, human resources and local culture, which makes the connection between the county government and the grassroots society more direct and close. It is flexible to adapt to regional differences with the diversity of institutional arrangements; while provincial and prefecture-level governments are difficult to form a unified structure in governance, they are mainly positioned at the macro level. In terms of comprehensiveness, the view of the county government 1 was inspired by Zhou Xueguang's article "The Logic of State Governance and the Chinese Bureaucracy: A Weber Theory Perspective" (unpublished).

Compared with the township-level government, the new changes in the county-level government governance model are more complete in administrative structure and more jurisdictional, and can complete the integrated governance tasks that townships cannot undertake and complete.

In this way, we can better understand why the “administrative-political one company” triad integration governance mechanism will appear at the county level.

2. “Project Platform”: Local Coping Strategies under the Central Control Policy From the perspective of the national regulatory policy framework, the “administrative-political one company” triad integration mechanism seems to have many practices that contradict and conflict with its own intentions, but from local practice From a perspective, the “project platform” that the integration mechanism relies on, especially the investment and financing project platform, is largely a response to the central government's various regulatory policies, reflecting the new characteristics of the relationship between the central and local governments.

For example, the project “company system” is used to circumvent legal risks. Despite the introduction of the 1994 Budget Law, local governments were not allowed to include deficits, and the government could not borrow; in 1995, the Guarantee Law was introduced, and state agencies were not allowed to make loans to banks, but in fact, there were various countermeasures. For example, in the name of (state-owned) companies, funds, etc., bypass legal restrictions for legal financing, and reasonable borrowing of money. After 2000, some local governments began to try to borrow on urban infrastructure and utilities projects, or issue municipal engineering debt for financing. Obviously, due to imperfect national regulations and system regulations, the company system can break through the constraints of the budget law and help local governments achieve "hidden debt."

Another example is to extend the unlimited liability of the government with “corporatization”. Under the urbanization model, the government “runs the company” is different from the township enterprise in the period of obtaining tax revenue by directly “running the enterprise”. The “running company” aims to produce, construct and operate public goods through the scarcity of resources such as possessing and operating land. The project company obtains investment and financing income and tax revenue. According to China's "Company Law", the company refers to limited liability companies and joint stock limited companies, which have all the attributes of the enterprise and do not recognize unlimited liability companies. However, the corporatization has made the local government find a new space for development. The government company is completely different from other industrial and commercial companies, and it is like a politicized unlimited liability company, which makes the relationship between “government, one company and one bank” more complicated.

After the reform of the economic system, the relationship between government and enterprises has changed towards marketization. The government has given up some "enterprise-type state-owned assets", but it has added another path to increase the "Guangdong National Investment Bankruptcy Case" in 1999 is a typical event. When the company filed a bankruptcy application, the provincial government did not theoretically need to rescue the enterprises with extremely chaotic internal management. However, in the face of many problems such as maintaining social stability, the provincial government has to protect this state-owned company, withdrawing 5.9 billion yuan from the finances, entrusting the Bank of China Guangdong Branch to pay deposits to individual depositors, and entrusting GF Securities to host Guangdong Guotou. The securities business department, and from the bankruptcy property to make up the misappropriated shareholder deposit. At the same time, the provincial government has taken out more than 4.74 million yuan to properly resettle 629 employees of Guangdong Guotou. This series of measures has cleared the way for Guangdong Guotou to successfully enter the bankruptcy and debt repayment process. 1 It can be seen that when local governments use state-owned companies to solve financial problems, local state-owned companies will also force local governments to assume joint responsibility in the face of problems such as restructuring and bankruptcy; when financial crisis occurs, local financial risks may be transformed into fiscal Debt risk.

Then, why do local governments assume such a large joint responsibility, local governments have to pay for their own financial strategies; second, the new model of the relationship between the government and financial institutions, silver and political cooperation, provides another growth condition, and Government actions have created new incentives.

The “bundling loan” model pioneered in Wuhu, Anhui Province is a typical case. In 1998, the National Development Bank first piloted the “bundling loan” model in Wuhu, Anhui Province, and became a major way for local investment expansion. The core of the “bundling” construction loan is the government's commitment, financial bottom, and then market-based operation by project. Later, the development bank improved it as a credit model. First, the local government was asked to designate its state-owned agency “Urban Construction Investment Company” as a borrower to apply for loans to government project investment. The local government also planned its own projects. "Bundling" followed. According to national laws, the annual budget is subject to approval by the People's Congress. The Development Bank requires the local people's congress to issue official documents to approve the above-mentioned commitments of the local government. In this way, Anhui Province can regularly receive tens of billions of loans from the China Development Bank. 2 In this “banking cooperation” model, the government guarantee and the project “bundling loan” are the core content, which follows the “project-finance-development” logic, which is the “alternative” that the national control policy does not allow the government to borrow. Strategy. The reason why the project promotes local economic development has become the only choice for promoting urbanization in many places. It is because in the construction impulse of “bigger and stronger” local governments, only when multiple public utilities projects are bundled on the project platform, The appeal of extensive mobilization and centralized construction. 3 After experiencing the financial risks of the industrialization stage dominated by township enterprises, the reason why banks are willing to cooperate with local governments is because the government has obtained greater land development rights after the tax-sharing system. Land as a collateral has less risk than corporate assets, and urbanization is promoted by land appreciation. It is also a response strategy for the tax-sharing reform.

The above-mentioned "project company implicit debt", "government unlimited joint responsibility", "banking cooperation, a bundle of loans" and "grain core resource monopoly" and other strategies to deal with national control policies have created a "platform" "The organization mode is a large-scale "investment and financing to build" governance model. This can avoid legal and policy risks, and can also form a unified governance situation for county governments.

Take the county and city we surveyed in the east as an example. In a large-scale local state-owned enterprise restructuring in the 20th century, a city (county) left only a public-owned water company and individual enterprises with complex debts, and the rest were all converted. After the financial crisis, with the large-scale investment and construction of the country, the local supporting construction was launched, and the state-owned companies re-emerged at 2 o'clock: "Fiscal Decentralization, Government Competition and Debt of Local Governments in China", Beijing: China Financial and Economic Publishing House ,page.

3 fold Xiaoye, Chen Yingying: "The hierarchical operation mechanism and governance logic of the project system" - the new changes in the sociological county government governance model of the "project into the village" case, in which the investment and financing planning is coordinated with various There are five companies with investment and financing companies.

The registered capital of these companies comes from the government's financial allocation, which is in the range of hundreds of millions, ranging from single digits to ten digits, up to 6 billion. In the operation of capital, government financial allocations only account for small heads, and government companies account for large amounts of financing. In 2010, for example, in the municipal projects arranged for the year, the financial allocation only accounted for 5%, the government financing accounted for 73.6% (including government investment of 2.79%), self-raised 17.2%, and the other accounted for 42%. In the project, the financial allocation accounted for 3.6%, and the government financing accounted for 77. Then, why does the government particularly prefer companies with investment and financing functions when reorganizing the company? First, it is based on the company system to break through the budget law; secondly, it is in the inter-county competition. Your Majesty, you will lose money without borrowing money. This will not be able to highlight political achievements or engage in large-scale urban and rural construction. Finally, only by constantly borrowing money can we maintain the general psychology of the Tao.

The local government state-owned company represented by investment and financing is not a purely industrial and commercial entity, but a “comprehensive” organization with a government background, a platform to help the government “hidden borrowing”, so it needs assistance and the safety factor is higher. The possibility of financing is greater. The “project platform” governance has become a new organizational and institutional mechanism for governments at all levels. 3 A series of complicated "government-company" relationships are not a simple derivative of the relationship between government and enterprises in the planned economy, but a strategic relationship of local developmentism arising from new central and local relations, a newly formed " Growth Alliance." The so-called "operating nature" of local governments is not simply an economic behavior, but a concept of integration of government administrative control, political mobilization, and corporate operations.

Third, the transformation of local government business model: from "enterprise" to "land" to "urbanization"

From the establishment of the local government business model and how it is transformed, it is possible to observe the trend of continuous enhancement of the government's operational characteristics. The following cases and interview materials in the text are all from the 2012 “Evolution of Urban-Rural Relations” research group.

See Fen Xiaoye, Chen Yingying: “The hierarchical operation mechanism and governance logic of the project system”. For the discussion of “government operators” in the case of “projects entering the village”, see Yang Shanhua, Su Hong: “From the agency type” The regime operators "to the profit-seeking business behavior. 1 For the county, because the local government monopolizes the core resource land of urbanization, has the financial capacity of public investment and capital mobilization ability, thus occupying the main position of the operating city, Business philosophy and behavior play a leading role. Because the local government's goal has a dual orientation, it has both the public interest goal of being an "agent" and its own special interest goal as an operator; therefore, when it is a business city When it comes to the subject of behavior, it is inevitable to pursue the maximization of local benefits and the choice of strategies that are most conducive to the performance of political achievements and the needs of special groups.

In the new round of urbanization strategy, the key to understanding local government behavior is to discover how its dynamic mechanism is transformed. Throughout the reform of the local government's business behavior for more than 30 years, we can find that the characteristics of its "business" have never changed. The change is only a new business behavior under a new constraint, but from the deep structure, The essence of transformation is the change of governance structure and the adjustment of institutional logic. In this change, because the local government under the centralized political system is actually an economic entity that cannot be bankrupt, it cannot be changed by the soft-constrained system of the current fragmentation, nor can it be bound by the laws of the main department. There have always been unique conditions to pass on the cost of externalities to society. 2 From the context of local government behavior, we can at least capture the changes in two business objectives, from the operation of township enterprises to the management of land, and then from the operation of land to the urbanization of business. The tax-sharing reform can be seen as an important institutional incentive for change.

After the reform of the tax-sharing system in 1994, the central and local governments clearly defined the tax categories. The biggest change was the taxation of the largest tax category of enterprises, which was defined as the central and local shared tax, of which the central proportion was 75%. After the sub-tax reform, corporate income tax and personal income tax were also changed to shared tax, 60% of which was collected by the central government. Obviously, local governments have not received much benefit from township and village enterprises. In addition, the government has faced several difficulties in directly operating enterprises. It has become a wise move to abandon business operations.

Under these conditions, in addition to the specific taxes and fees reserved by local governments, the land revenue and local government debt, financing and working capital have become the most important sources of funds. 3 Among them, the significance of controlling land element resources and expanding land development rights is particularly profound. From the perspective of tax distribution, among the local income, land-related income, such as urban land use tax, cultivated land occupation tax, land value-added tax and other major tax revenues, are 100% owned by the local government. The precondition is that the state gives local governments the right to levy urban and rural land as state-owned. Therefore, directly operating the land and obtaining indirect taxation of land becomes the most profitable business for local government finance.

The central government does not participate in the sharing of the net income generated by land acquisition, which is different from the tax paid by the enterprise, either local taxes or extra-budgetary or non-budgetary income. Its management and use are also relatively free, and 1 about “operating cities” and “urban management”, see Cui Weihua: “A New Perspective on Urban Management of China's Urban Economic Issues”, Dalian: Dongbei University of Finance and Economics Press, 2005, "introduction".

Cui Weihua: A New Perspective on Urban Management of China's Urban Economic Issues, pp. 142-145.

The new scale of county government governance model is far greater than corporate taxation. With such huge interests, it can be easily understood why local government behavior patterns are transferred from development enterprises to urbanization based on land development. 1 However, after all, land finance is a life of exhaustion and fishing. After the central government has implemented three orders to curb land finance, from the perspective of comprehensive governance of local governments, it is the most legitimate way to operate by changing the business model on the basis of land finance and adopting the urbanization model, especially the urban-rural integration model. It is not only conducive to continuing to use the land to obtain urbanization economic benefits, but also to complete various local “modernization indicators” and “small well-being social indicators” from industrialization to urbanization. More importantly, after the conversion, the monopoly power of land development makes the government and its company eventually become the monopolist and the biggest beneficiary of urbanization.

Therefore, in terms of business objectives, local governments have changed from “operating enterprises” to “operating land”.

Then switch to the “Operational Urbanization Project” and the corresponding shift from industrialization to urbanization. Since the land finance is mainly derived from the value-added value of land converted to commercial land, its follow-up value needs to be obtained through the operating city, and all the benefits of “doing things” around urbanization can fall into the county, so as long as the financial loose, “ Borrowing money to do big things will inevitably become the basic mode of operation of the county. Among them, with the investment and financing platform management project, the local government can integrate the government-invested projects and construction units in the infrastructure field to form a large-scale network organization system involving many enterprises and industries to carry out urbanization project development.

It is worth noting that from the beginning of “operating land”, the land that is the three major elements of the economy (land, labor and capital) may leap from the formerly more labor and capital to the more implicit position of social attributes. The core element of local economic growth. 2 The second tax sharing system provides an opportunity structure for county urbanization driven by operating land. The main participants are the government and capital investors, while the owners of land (including homesteads) use rights.农民及其集体，则是被奄挟进去的被动参与者。从经营土地到经营企业再到经营城市化项目这转换，对于隐藏其后的治理结构关系产生了深远影响。

首先，中央与地方的控制权结构发生变化。分税制突出了土地作为地方增长之核心资源的作用，极大地扩展了地方自主城市化的权力，相应地减弱了中央对县域城市化发展的控制权。县域政府这一权力的扩展必然遵循自主城市化的扩展逻辑。

②参见周靖祥：《土地研究将成解读中国经济增长的核心要素》，《中国社会科学报》2011年8月25日，第9版。

③所谓“机会结构”，是指国家所提供的外部制度环境并不能直接影响和制约行动者的行为，而是通过借助这一制度环境所营造的机会对人的行为产生作用（参见折晓叶、艾云：《城乡关系演变的研究路径种社会学研究思路和分析框架》，《社会发展研究》，北京：中国社会科学出版社，2013年）。这个观点受到与夏传玲等教授讨论的启发。

正如一些研究指出的，由于土地财政和城市建设投资是经济增长的关键，经济增长又被认为是社会稳定的保障，在“保增长、保稳定”的战略目标下，任何强力遏制土地开发的政策都无法得到有效落实。所以，中央对地方的干涉既包括能力上的限制，又包括意图上的顾忌，因此地方陷入了“既不能、又不为”的双重困境。①结果，在新一轮城市化增长中，政府的“经营性”特点突出，兴起“企业家化城市治理”、“地方行销”、“都市行销”的冲动，主张把城市视为一个企业，把市长比作企业家，像企业家经营企业那样经营城市。②其次，发展的主体结构发生变化。工业化时期的核心资源是企业，发展的主体主要不是地方政府而是属地各种类型的企业，因为政府无法垄断工业资源，工业化需要借助属地以外的大中城市工业。但是，占有土地开发垄断权则具有完全不同的意义。县域政府通过征地权，几乎垄断了城市（镇）化的最为核心的资源，其独立性和自主性都大为扩展，成为属地城市（镇）化的主导力量。

最后，产权结构发生变化。工业化时期，土地的非农使用权在村集体，“办企业”重又实体化了工业集体制。非农使用虽改变了农户与集体的使用权关系，但农户仍在名义上拥有土地承包权，还可以分享土地的后续收益。但城市化启动后强化的土地储备制度，通过行政征地，彻底改变了农户和集体与被征土地的关系，县域政府成为这部分土地的产权所有者。随着土地储备量的增长，政府的“经营”行为不可避免地向着那些最有利可图的领域转换。

这一系列变化，都构成了城市化过程中地方政府“行政一政治一公司”三位一体统合模式形成的基础条件。

四、城市化“土地核心项目平台”的运作那么，城市化项目在县域是如何经营，又如何贯彻三位体统合机制的昵从案例县（市）的观察看，在经营城市化项目中，县域政府行为具有一些新特点，表现出行政化、政治化和公司化相结合的取向。地方政府在城市化项目经营上的有效性，取决于行政、政治和公司机制在以土地为核心的项目平台上的统合体化运作。政府为主导，结合市场机制的政企关系、政银关系、政社关系、政民关系的“大戏”，只有在这一项目平台上才能上演成功。

笔者以某案例市（县）级城建项目投融资平台为例，通过追踪一些重大项目获批和执行的流程，发现一个重大的城市化项目必须经过如下过程：①渠敬东、周飞舟、应星：《从总体支配到技术治理基于中国30年改革经验的社会②崔卫华：《城市经营中国城市经济问题研究的新视角》，第2、18―20页。

县域政府治理模式的新变化1.土地储备及其提供和抵押。在以投融资为目标的项目平台上，土地核心资源只有落实到项目才能综合配置和利用。相应地，政府经营城市化项目的核心条件，也是拥有辖区土地开发权，而控制土地开发权的主要方式是建立土地收购储备制度。

我国土地储备制度的核心，一是赋予地方政府主要是县市级政府土地开发权，为县市级扩大了征地的行政权力。为适应政府职能转变的需要，县市级政府从国土部门分离出土地储备中心，授权其完成土地储备任务，并且建立由政府注资的土地公司（或授权城建投融资公司将其设为子公司）来经营土地。二是明确土地储备计划和储备资金项目与银行贷款之间的关系，规定土地储备机构向银行等金融机构申请的贷款应为担保贷款，应持财政部门的贷款规模批准文件及同级人民政府批准的项目实施方案等书面材料向当地商业银行及其他金融机构申请担保贷款。由于政府储备土地的目的是满足工业化和城市化的开发需求，而促成土地大量需求的个重要原因，就是城市化所需资金要通过土地抵押贷款来获得。因此，土地储备成为勾连政府与金融机构及其资本间的一个非常重要的环节。地方政府通常以土地储备为中心、政府性公司和开发区为载体向银行进行土地抵押，以此获得银行贷款，弥补地方财政资金的不足。

在案例县（市），围绕土地开发形成了从储备到拍卖、从注资到抵押的系列复杂的组织体系。土地机构主要有两种，是储备中心，其主要职能是编制土地收购储备计划，办理土地收购储备手续，代表政府持有收购储备的存量土地；组织储备土地地面附着物拆迁、安置、补偿、管线迁移、土地平整等前期开发工作。土地实施前期开发后列入政府可供地，经过拍卖后的资金归入财政。二是土地公司，政府将尚不具备拍卖条件的土地直接注资给专业的由政府独资的土地公司，授予其土地一级开发权，经由它们开发的土地可进入二级市场，拍卖时转回到储备中心进行拍卖。或者将土地直接注资给投融资公司内部建立的土地公司，授予其土地一级开发权，负责把土地用于项目贷款抵押。这一部分土地或只作抵押之物，之后需经过开发成为可拍卖土地，再转回储备中心拍卖，拍卖资金进入政府财政；或经直接拍卖后将溢价用于还贷。

其中个重要环节是，土地抵押的还贷任务主要由政府财政来还，因为拍卖所得进入政府财政，其收益要拿出部分用于还债。因此需要政府的专门机构如“金融办”和国资委来调节，相关机构安排主要领导人互相兼职，如国资委主任兼财政副局长，等等。作为抵押物的土地此时已经与项目没有直接关系。这一运作，实际上只依靠投融资平台无法完成，必须与政府财政相结合。所以，投融资公司并非独立的经济单位，而是一个勾连相关利益者的项目平台。

2.立项。重大项目由政府规划设立议案，上报人代会批准立项后，政府项目部门（项目办或投资办）批复城建投融资公司执行。人代会针对投融资公司提出的重大贷款请求，以政府财政和所储备的土地做担保，向银行做出书面借还贷承诺。

可以看到，按照法规，政府的重大公共建设和发展规划，需视土地储备可能达到的数量而设立，并且当地方政府公共财政投向公益项目时才具有合法性，通过项目才能落实，而土地只有落实到项目才能拍卖增值；对于银行来说，资金也只有落实到项目才能借贷；至于投融资公司，只有包装项目才能获得银行资金即“项目融资”，而项目公司和企业只有得到项目，才能进入地方规划建设领域，得到建设用地，获取财政支持和银行贷款，等等。这是一套借助项目、经由完整的行政机制来运作的过程。

正是以项目作为中介，地方政府不仅获得了将公共性项目间接转化为经营性项目的有利条件，同时也借助项目的合法性，在土地经营中节约了大量社会成本，因此，项目对于地方政府的吸引力，不仅表现在项目所含的资金量，更在于它如同是种催化剂，没有它，政府行为就不可能潜在地转化为经营行为，不可能营造更大的经营空间，获取更大的收益。①但是，行政立项机制最大的问题是，依靠财政投资并不能满足快速增长的城市化建设需求，而依靠行政也不能解决银行资本或金融资本投入问题。即便是项目资金与地方政府所能动员的各种财力加起来，往往也支撑不了这种综合建设规划的资金需求。因此，地方“融资平台''应运而生。

3.投融资本。在城市化过程中，政府的土地财政不足以支撑城市化，金融成为推进城市化的重要因素。②在本案例的城市化项目融资中，政府的财政投入占有一定比例，但主要通过向金融机构融资来解决巨大的投入需求。地方“融资平台''建设的根本在于必须具备大规模借贷的资质和能力。在项目平台错综复杂的关系网中，占据核心位置的是”城建投融资公司“，以此为基础搭建一个由政府组建的、为了在与银行博弈时赢得主动而引入的新的平台。截至2010年末，地方政府融资平台中，县级（含县级市）平台约占70%.政府的城建投融资平台担负动员资本的职责，但银行看重的不是投融资公司的资产，而是其背后的政府担保。正是由于这些公司的贷款是以县级财政和土地抵押作为担保，拥有较高的信用级别，所以银行融资相对顺利，可以取得更大规模的金融贷款以投入城市建设。政府虽无指令银行机构的权力，但有动员银行资金的能量。通常，政府重大项目需上报人代会批准，地方人代会负有批准项目投资方向、传达政府意图、进行战略动员的义务，甚至需要应银行要求，向银行出具项目借还贷的政治承诺。而这种政治承诺，是以政府财政和土地抵押的信誉作③2011年6月1日央行发布《2010年中国区域金融运行报告》，指出地方政府融资平台的贷款风险，2011年6月2县域政府治理模式的新变化为担保的。

4.项目执行。城建投融资公司是项目具体执行的组织者。通过上述环节获得土地和贷款后，投融资公司下设的项目公司具体运作项目。项目主要由其子公司执行，部分采用招投标的市场化方式由其他建设公司和企业承担。城市化建设中公共基础设施建设是重要环节，建设项目一般分为两类，赢利性和非赢利性。非赢利性的项目是公益性的，企业基本不会投入巨资进行经营，主要是由政府财政投资，由企业投标实施。对于赢利性项目，企业总是趋之若骛。因此，针对投资企业对城镇基础设施建设项目存在利益选择的偏好，县级政府往往对两种性质不同的项目给出不同的“运作”方式和规则，甚至将两种方式加以结合，从中获利。

由上可见，“土地项目平台”已成为地方政府统合其行政、政治、公司力量的有效组织和制度载体。凭借这一制度载体，地方国资公司在城市化中的作用凸显，甚至具有垄断性地位和如下特权：其，公司拥有政府的某些处理重大事务的处置权力，如土地储备、经营和开发、优先获取和发包规划项目、以政府信誉和承诺获取银行贷款等。特别是，政府公司作为地方国资公司就此垄断性地担当了城市化的职责，也就成为城市化的最大受益者之1.其二，政府拥有公司赢利的一切权力，如在一级市场强征土地、调换建设指标等，政府公司赚钱的能力远超常规的商业公司，且可将最大的利益留在政府。其三，常规商业公司受到一系列合约和规则的制约，政府公司则几乎不会受到限制，融资可以直接通过公共信贷渠道获取，甚至破产也会由政府兜底。

在土地项目平台上，土地公司和城建投融资公司这两个地方国资公司相互依存，发挥着关键性的组织机制作用。

土地公司作为政府储备土地和经营土地的重要“抓手”，代表政府通过项目拍卖土地达到升值。在这一环节上，政府通过垄断一级土地市场完成土地储备后，土地公司便承担着开发的具体工作。公司运用市场经营机制，对规划用地进行前期投资，通过完善基础设施，进行“三通一平”（指通水、通气、通电和平整地面），将“生地”养成“熟地”，以提高土地价值，激活二级市场，同时以土地作为抵押，通过多渠道抵押融资，筹措资金，解决城市建设投入问题。

某案例县以经营土地为主业的建设开发有限公司，用县新区中心的市民广场土地注册，注册资本中县土地储备中心出资占90%，主要承担基础设施建设和房地产开发，属于典型的政府投资的国资公司，直接对县政府负责。公司内部按公司制运作，采用市场化的招投标方式选择项目执行单位，同时吸引辖域内外建设资本进入项目。

案例中的土地公司最突出的特点是其地方国资公司的身份和职能。它可以代理政府处置土地开发和经营问题，以至于案例县辖区内的重要基础设施和房地产开发项目都是由土地公司直接经营的。同时，由于土地可作为最直接最有升值潜力的抵押物，土地公司也就成为协助投融资公司（有些地方土地公司即为投融资公司的下属公司）获取银行资本贷款的最强竞争者，特别是在大规模推进城市化过程中，就更具有吸引银行资本或金融资本进入投融资平台的能力。如案例中的土地公司自成立以来，与省内外各大金融机构以及国家开发银行等建立了良好的信用关系，多渠道筹措建设资金。2005年该公司承担了县政府向国家开发银行融资的任务，争取到45亿元贷款额度，为项目设计中的诸多城市建设项目注入了资金。

然而，以土地为核心的投融资项目建立在对土地升值的较高预期上，政府财政的行政担保和人代会的政治担保，使这一预期被一再抬高，一旦土地升值遭遇风险而难以兑现时，还贷的强压力就可能转化为“地方债式”的金融风险。目前，这风险在案例县市和其他一些地区，特别是工业化和城市化速度偏高的地区已经显现。

这也正是地方政府经营城市化项目中三重机制共同作用下不可避免的后果之一。

地方政府行为从“经营土地”向“经营（城市化）项目”转变的环节中，最为关键的是动员出能够投向项目的资本，包括银行资本或金融资本、城市工商资本，而这些资本投入的先决条件是要借助地方政府的行政权力。城建投融资公司承担着这一特别的政府任务，其最为核心的作用是将土地资源优势转化为银行资本或金融资本优势。前已述及，当一块土地作为某个城建项目的抵押物获得贷款后，这块土地就完成了任务，还贷的任务往往最终由政府财政承担。之后，银行资本或金融资本作为城市化建设的核心资源进入项目平台，成为支撑平台的重要支柱。投融资公司之所以能够完成这种转换，正是取决于其国资公司性质，它可以将土地资源的收益转化为政府财政收入，使财政成为银行资本赢利的保障。

在县域城市化过程中，地方辖区的城市化要素，如公共财政、土地、工业资本等，都需要借助银行资本或金融资本的巨额投入，才能盘活起来。虽然银行资本或金融资本独立于地方政府，但它对城市化的推助需借助政府项目才能运作。

正如有研究指出的，财政资金的专项化在政府治理的“大盘子”中已退居其次，以土地抵押、政府融资为主的银行资本或金融资金的项目化正大行其道，而各种项目的规模也远非财政专项资金可以相比。这些项目大多以地方政府为主体、以土地开发为依托、以银行资本或金融资金为支撑，成为各地发展城市化的主要手段；而且，为解决征地指标的瓶颈约束，各地正掀起“迁村腾地”、“拆院并院”

的“农民上楼”高潮。在这些项目运作中，由政府主导，各种社会资本也逐步参与其中，对基层社会正产生巨大影响。①由政府公司完成的投融资，已成为支撑中国经济增长的强劲动力。

县域政府治理模式的新变化银行资本或金融资本推助下的城市化，无疑可以迅速提高城市化率。当“经营城市化项目”成为地方新的增长动力机制后，房地产业便替代传统工业产业，成为发展城市新经济的主导战略。银行资本或金融资本介入城市化项目后，增长最快的也是房地产业。房地产的过度开发，也与一些地方政府急于变现其所储备的土地有直接关系，而土地的升值又必须借助银行资本或金融资本和房地产资本，它们共同助推了近年中国县域城市化的急速发展。

五、讨论与结论在对县域及以下基层政府改革的先期研究中，由乡镇企业鼎盛而引发的对地方政府治理模式的探讨，为人们提供了关于“地方政府法团主义”和“政府即厂商”的丰富想象，这对于思考县域地方政府的制度安排和行为逻辑具有很大的启发性。然而，在以乡镇企业为表征的工业化开始向城市化转型的过程中，事情发生了重大变化。我们以城市化项目经营的过程作为观察的窗口，对“地方政府法团主义''进行了反思，提出”行政一政治一公司“三位一体统合治理模式。

这治理模式的制度逻辑在于，只有依靠“土地核心项目平台”，县域政府的行政机制所表达的“权力”才能在县域属地发展中，借助“扩权强县”、“县改市”以及城市化和城乡一体化等新举措被大大地扩展。但这种行政化权力要突破“服务型政府”的合法性要求而进入谋利型发展的需求，还需要启动其政治动员的能力，表达其发展“意志”，运用公司机制规避政策和法律风险，实现其绩效。在这过程中，政府借助“项目制”平台，通过行政审批权获得了对核心资源的垄断权力，通过政治动员发挥了主导力量，又通过公司制承担了经济发展主体的角色，其权力、意志、绩效三者空前地互为推动，产生出新的活力。这种统合治理的模式已渗入城乡建设的各个层面，其能量和意义远远超过“地方政府法团主义''的角色定位。这种政府角色的演变，正是县域城市（镇）化既突飞猛进又困境重重的重要原因。

然而，“行政一政治一公司”三位一体相结合，虽然颇有成效地解决了推进城市化的动力、资金和资源以及绩效等问题，但却先天地存在着一个内在的制度悖效在辖区内的互为推动。于是，一方面地方政府为属地发展提供有力支撑，其中不失为避免社会冲突而解决问题的动机，另一方面急速推进的城市化却又是引发社会问题的源头，致使城市化的推进难以完成从量到质的升级。当它借助“项目平台”高速运转时，科层化的行政机制往往服从于政治机制所表达的领导者的意志，更多地依赖党政和人代会的组织动员能力来推动城市化进程，依靠垄断性的政府公司调动稀缺资源和资本。诚然，通过调动稀缺资源和资本无疑可以加大基础设施的投入，提供城市化所需的公共物品，但是在政绩和利益驱动下的过热投入又导致公共服务疏于供给，反过来抑制了城市化水平的提升，以至于政府提供的公共物品越多，与当地社会的疏离感越强，甚至其自身也陷入因争夺土地核心资源的冲突中难以自拔，从而丧失了动员辖区社会的能力。于是，为发展而构建的组织形式可能有悖于属地政府的合理适度发展的职责，导致过度或虚假的城市化现象，最终违背发展规律并不顾及社会绩效。这正是经济学家诺斯在1981年提出的“诺斯悖论”的某种表现，即国家的存在是经济增长的关键，然而国家又是经济衰退的根源。①制“机制具有直接关联。新中国成立前后中国共产党领导下的现代国家对乡村的治理，直具有”政权下乡、政党下乡、行政下乡、政策下乡、法律下乡“的传统，②而在农村经济体制改革后，1990年代以来，”项目“词越来越广泛和深入到城市化过程中，”项目制“作为一种制度思维，已经从财政转移支付领域扩展到地方政府治理辖区的各个领域，如地方政府将城市化建设内容制定成各种项目来运作。它表明国家部门的行政机制通过各种项目活动重又影响和控制着乡村社会，并由此构建出新的治理乡村的国家意识。③城市化过程中的”土地核心项目平台“就是重要的制度载体，为政府统合行政、政治和公司的力量，实现其权力、意志和绩效的互为推动，发挥着重要作用。

目前地方的城市化主要以增加投入为基础，政府虽然能够有效组织和动员资源投入到城市化增长中，却难以提高效率和技术水平，特别是提升全要素生产率。如果从房地产业在二线城市的困境如房地产开发小区空置率过高